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Modelling choice when price is a cue for quality  1 
A case study with Chinese wine consumers 2 
Abstract 3 
Experience products are those the quality of which cannot be ascertained until after 4 
consumption, forcing consumers to base their purchase decision on an expectation of the 5 
SURGXFW¶V TXDOLW\ 7KLV expected quality is based on cues available before purchase, 6 
among which price is noteworthy, as consumers tend to believe that higher prices imply 7 
higher quality. But price also stresses the FRQVXPHUV¶ EXGJHW UHVWULFWLRQ, inducing a 8 
double -and conflicting- global effect on purchase probability. Using the traditional 9 
formulation of Random Utility Models for experience goods (i.e. introducing all attributes 10 
directly in the utility function) can lead to an endogeneity problem due to the omission of 11 
expected quality, introducing bias on the results. 12 
Using a stated wine choice experiment conducted in China as a case study, we correct for 13 
endogeneity by modelling HDFK DOWHUQDWLYH¶V expected quality as a latent variable, 14 
explained by all available quality cues, including price. Then we explain choice as a trade-15 
off between price and expected quality. This allows us to separate both effects of price 16 
and correct for at least one source of endogeneity while being consistent with behavioural 17 
theory; this has either been ignored or not treated correctly in previous literature. 18 
Moreover, as the model requires only a quality indicator for each alternative to achieve 19 
identification, the respondents¶EXUGHQLQFUHDVHVPDUJLQDOO\. 20 
Our results show that the use of latent variables reduces endogeneity and effectively 21 
allows to measure both effects of price separately, obtaining higher significance and 22 
correct signs for its parameters. 23 
Keywords: endogeneity, hybrid choice models, latent variables, experience good, wine. 24 
2 
 
1 Introduction 1 
Price is a key attribute in choice experiments. It is not only relevant for consumers and 2 
producers, but from a modelling perspective it is also used to calculate willingness to pay 3 
(WTP) estimates and the price elasticity of demand. However, the effect of price on 4 
consumers can be twofold. The quality of certain products, such as new foods and 5 
beverages, is uncertain before purchase because it cannot be fully evaluated until after 6 
consumption (Nelson, 1970; Grisolía et al., 2012). Other products, such as jewellery and 7 
some medicines have uncertain qualities even after purchase, as consumer do not have 8 
the means or knowledge to determine them. In these cases, consumers resort to extrinsic 9 
cues to determine product quality (i.e. they construct an expected quality). Any attribute 10 
that can be perceived before purchase, such as packaging, publicity, health claims, store 11 
advertising, etc., can constitute an extrinsic cue for quality. Among these, price may 12 
become a highly relevant cue for quality (Leavitt, 1954), as consumers tend to assume 13 
that higher prices are associated with higher quality in the case of many products. In these 14 
cases, price has a double effect: a positive one due to its role as a cue for quality, and a 15 
negative effect due to the FRQVXPHUV¶EXGJHWFRQVWUDLQts. 16 
In discrete choice models, the double effect of price can generate an endogeneity problem, 17 
causing coefficient estimates to be biased. This happens because as modellers, we do not 18 
REVHUYHFRQVXPHUV¶H[SHFWHGTXDOLW\IRUWKHSURGXFW, and as this variable correlates with 19 
price, omitting it from the utility function makes price endogenous. 20 
Even though the literature offers several approaches to deal with endogeneity in discrete 21 
choice models (Guevara 2015), the latent variable approach is particularly suitable for 22 
cases where quality is uncertain to the consumer at the time of purchase. It also provides 23 
a reliable framework both from a methodological and a behavioural perspective, as it 24 
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employs a tested econometric approach (hybrid choice models, Walker & Ben-Akiva 1 
2002) and a well-developed behavioural theory (signalling mechanisms, Milgrom & 2 
Roberts 1986). 3 
The approach consists in modelling expected quality as a latent variable, explained by the 4 
SURGXFW¶V observable attributes (including price), while the actual purchase choice is 5 
explained by the trade-off between price and expected quality. This easily fits the frame 6 
of a stated preference (SP) experiment, where besides recording participantV¶ FKRLFHV, 7 
only an additional indicator of quality is required. Under the appropriate structure, the 8 
modeller can correct for endogeneity and measure both the positive and negative effects 9 
of price, while keeping the analysis in line with behavioural theory and not overwhelming 10 
respondents with excessive additional tasks. 11 
In this paper, we use wine as a case study to test the latent variable approach to correct 12 
for endogeneity, in accordance to behavioural theory. To this end, we use a computer-13 
based stated choice experiment which was responded by a particular sample of Chinese 14 
wine consumers, experts and students. We find that the method provides promising 15 
results, and propose further topics for future research. 16 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review 17 
about the double effect of price and endogeneity in discrete choice models and their 18 
treatment in the foods and beverages literature. Section 3 provides details of the survey, 19 
the sample of participants and the models used. Results are presented on section 4 and 20 
discussed in section 5. 21 
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2 Literature review 1 
2.1 Double effect of price 2 
In traditional economic theory, price is expected to have a negative effect on the purchase 3 
probability GXHWRFRQVXPHUV¶EXGJHWFRQVWUDLQts; however, under some circumstances a 4 
positive effect may also exist. Scitovsky (1945) proposes that higher prices can be 5 
attractive if consumers assume price to be a cue for quality (i.e. they assume that price 6 
and quality are positively correlated), a rational assumption in perfect markets. Leavitt 7 
(1954) did one of the first experimental measurements of this phenomenon, discovering 8 
a tendency to choose the most expensive product when there were no other cues for 9 
quality, especially on product categories with heterogeneous levels of quality (i.e. vertical 10 
differentiation). 11 
Later studies confirmed the association between price and quality, and therefore the 12 
positive effect of higher prices on choice probability. Rao & Monroe (1989) showed that 13 
the price-quality association grew stronger as the price difference between alternatives 14 
increased, through a meta-analysis. Caves & Greene (1996) found a positive correlation 15 
between price and H[SHUW¶V quality ratings in 200 products, while controlling for other 16 
variables. They also found that the magnitude of the price-quality correlation depended 17 
on the product category and its vertical differentiation. Dodds et al. (1991) proposed and 18 
estimated a model where price positively influences perceived quality, and negatively 19 
influences willingness to buy, while controlling for brand and store information in the 20 
case of calculators and stereo headset players. 21 
Another possible explanation for the positive effect of price on purchase probability is 22 
what Lichtenstein et al. (1993) call prestige sensitivity, i.e., a ³IDYRurable perception of 23 
the price cue based on feelings of prominence and status that higher prices signal to other 24 
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SHRSOH DERXW WKH SXUFKDVHU´ This concept has been employed mainly in the area of 1 
fashion, and found to be strongly related with brand perception (Deeter-Schmelz et al. 2 
2000), as other people see brands, not prices. This phenomenon is also known as Veblen 3 
Effect (Veblen 1899/1994), and is directly related with the status provided by the 4 
consumption, and only indirectly related with price. Bagwell & Bernheim (1996) claim 5 
that ³« LQ D WKHRU\ RI FRQVSLFXRXV FRQVXPSWLRQ WKDW LV IDLWKIXO WR 9HEOHQ¶V DQDO\VLV6 
utility should be defined over consumption and status, rather than over consumption and 7 
SULFHV´7KHUHIRUHthis effect could be controlled for, to a reasonable degree, by including 8 
brand in the analysis.  9 
The positive effect of price on perceived quality has also been studied in the case of wines. 10 
Plassman et al. (2007) showed that higher prices can positively influence markers of 11 
pleasure in the brain activity, even though the wine itself remains unchanged. Aqueveque 12 
(2006; 2008) found a negative effect of price on perceived risk and a positive effect on 13 
perceived quality, though this effect tended WR GLVDSSHDU ZKHQ H[SHUWV¶ UDWLQJV were 14 
present and the consumption occasion did not involve other people. Lewis & Zalan (2014) 15 
showed that higher prices increased both reported enjoyment and willingness to pay 16 
among wine consumers. 17 
2.2 Endogeneity in discrete choice models and some ways to deal with it 18 
From an econometric perspective, the double effect of price generates an endogeneity 19 
problem. In this sub-section we present a simple framework to understand how 20 
endogeneity is caused by the price ± quality association, and review some alternatives to 21 
deal with. The different approaches to deal with endogeneity are discussed and evaluated 22 
based on their applicability to the problem at hand, that is, a stated choice experiment 23 
where the main source of endogeneity is the price ± quality association. 24 
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Endogeneity occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term of the 1 
model. This can be due to many reasons: omission of an explanatory variable correlated 2 
with an included variable, measurement errors in explanatory variables, simultaneous 3 
determination of both the dependent and one or more of the explanatory variables, self-4 
selection bias, among others (Guevara 2015). Endogeneity is a serious problem as it 5 
renders the estimated parameters inconsistent (see Wooldridge 2002, section 15.7.2 for a 6 
proof on binary choice models). 7 
One important source RIHQGRJHQHLW\LQWKHFDVHRISULFH¶VGRXEOHHIIHFWLVWKHRPLVVLRQ8 
of perceived quality as an explanatory variable. The omission of other unobservable 9 
attributes correlated with price can also play a role in the endogeneity problem (Guevara 10 
& Ben-Akiva 2012); however, if these attributes are relevant, they should also be 11 
correlated with perceived quality. Simultaneous determination is likely not a severe 12 
problem at the microscopic scale, because price is exogenous for each individual, as s/he 13 
does not influence price.  14 
More formally, consider the following true model for the utility U of individual n, for 15 
alternative j on choice scenario t. 16 
௡ܷ௝௧ ൌ ܺ௡௝௧ߚ௑ ൅ ௡ܻ௝௧ߚ௒ ൅ ߝ௡௝௧ 17 
where ܺ௡௝௧ and ௡ܻ௝௧ are attributes of alternative j, ߝ௡௝௧ is an independent identically 18 
distributed error among alternatives, scenarios and individuals, and ߚ௑ and ߚ௒ are 19 
parameters to be estimated. Now suppose the modeller does not observe ௡ܻ௝௧, therefore 20 
she estimates the following model. 21 
௡ܷ௝௧ ൌ ܺ௡௝௧ߚ௑ ൅ ߟ௡௝௧  22 
where ߟ௡௝௧ ൌ ௡ܻ௝௧ߚ௒ ൅ ߝ௡௝௧ . If X and Y are correlated, then so are ߟ௡௝௧  and X, introducing 23 
endogeneity in the model and therefore rendering the estimated ߚመ௑ inconsistent. In our 24 
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particular case, if we consider X to be a vector of attributes including price, and Y to be 1 
perceived quality, then the price-quality association would induce correlation between X 2 
and Y, generating an endogeneity problem. Then we would say that the explanatory 3 
variable price is endogenous. 4 
For discrete choice models, the most popular five ways to correct for endogeneity are the 5 
BLP method proposed by Berry et al. (1995), the use of proxies, the control function 6 
approach (CFA), the multiple indicators solution (MIS) and the use of latent variables 7 
(Guevara 2015). 8 
The BLP method requires market level data in the form of market shares for several 9 
different markets. This data is used to capture the endogeneity in constants for each 10 
market. This data requirement makes the method unsuitable for models estimated only 11 
with consumer-level information, such as our case study. 12 
The Proxy approach consists in including proxies of the unobserved variable in the utility 13 
function. A proxy must satisfy two requirements: (i) it must be independent of the choice 14 
model¶V error term and (ii) the difference between the proxy and the unobserved variable 15 
should be independent of all other explanatory variables. Both requirements can be 16 
fulfilled if the proxy is exogenous to the choice, it is measured with no error, and it is the 17 
cause of the unobserved variable (i.e. it is both exogenous to the unobserved variable and 18 
it correlates with it). Therefore, the main difficulty of this method is to find an appropriate 19 
proxy. For example, a proper proxy for the comfort experienced by a new passenger on a 20 
train is the density of passengers in the train before s/he boards. 21 
A proxy for perceived quality should be able to explain it while not being correlated with 22 
price. An objective measurement of quality should be a good proxy for perceived quality 23 
only if the objective quality does not correlate with price; however, it is not clear that 24 
such a measurement exists. In the case of wine, expert ratings may not be appropriate 25 
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either as their ability to measure objective quality has been seriously questioned (Lawless 1 
1984, Hodgson 2009)DVZHOODV WKHLUUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKFRQVXPHU¶VTXDOLW\SHUFHSWLRQ2 
(Lattey et al. 2009, Gokcekus & Nottebaum 2011, '¶$OHVVDQGUR 	 3HFRWLFK 2013, 3 
Hopfer & Heymann 2014). And even though consumers do use experts¶ ratings as a proxy 4 
for quality when available in hypothetical situations (Aqueveque 2006, Mastrobuoni et 5 
al. 2014), several studies have indicated that consumers are not really aware of them in 6 
real conditions (Channey 2000, Johnson & Bruwer 2004, Atkin & Thach 2012). 7 
Furthermore, it is likely that if an objective measurement of quality exists, it would 8 
correlate with price due to production costs. 9 
As our experiment used fictional wines, QRUHDOH[SHUWV¶TXDOLW\UDWLQJVZHUHDYDLODEOH10 
neither did we include fictional ratings as an extra attribute because Chinese consumers 11 
do not seem to FRQVLGHU H[SHUWV¶ UDWLQJV DW OHDVW LQ WKH IRUP RI SUL]HV RU ZULWWHQ12 
recommendation) among the most relevant cues for quality (Goodman 2009). 13 
In the particular case of wine, the weather during growth and harvest could be used as a 14 
proxy for quality, as wine quality is expected to depend largely on them. But the weather 15 
only influences the sensory (or intrinsic) quality of wine, and therefore it would not reflect 16 
the expected quality before purchase, when the consumer has not tasted the wine yet. 17 
Also, the weather is not available for fictional wines in a SP context. 18 
Another method to correct for endogeneity is the Control Function (CF) approach (Villas-19 
Boas & Winer 1999, Petrin & Train 2010), which is analogous to the Instrumental 20 
Variables approach on linear models (Wooldridge 2002, chapter 5). The CF approach 21 
requires the modeller to identify instrumental variables for the endogenous explanatory 22 
variable (in our case: price). The instrumental variables must fulfil two requirements: (i) 23 
correlate with the endogenous explanatory variable and (ii) be independent of the error 24 
terms. The estimation procedure has two stages: first, the endogenous variables are 25 
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regressed on the instrumental and other exogenous explanatory variables, and then the 1 
residuals of this regression are included in the choice utility along with the endogenous 2 
and exogenous explanatory variables. This way the new extended model is consistently 3 
estimated. Estimation can also be performed in a single step using Full Information 4 
Maximum Likelihood (Villas-Boas & Winer 1999, Train 2009 section 13.5, Guevara 5 
2015). The main difficulty with this procedure is finding adequate instrumental variables. 6 
Production costs are useful instruments (Villas-Boas & Winer 1999), but they are hardly 7 
available for real products, and do not exist in the case of fictional ones. The price of 8 
similar alternatives can also be used (Guevara & Ben-Akiva 2006), but once again, they 9 
do not exist in the context of hypothetical choices. And even though it is possible to design 10 
a stated choice experiment where the weather, the price of similar alternatives or other 11 
instruments are fictionally developed, its implementation would be convoluted and 12 
probably unrealistic. In summary, CF is hardly applicable on stated choice datasets, such 13 
as ours. 14 
A Multiple Indicator Solution (MIS) is yet another way to correct for endogeneity in 15 
discrete choice models (Guevara & Polanco 2016). This approach is a mixture between 16 
the use of a proxy and a control function. The method requires two indicators of the 17 
omitted variable. Indicators are only required to correlate with the unobserved variable, 18 
and not to be exogenous to the choice. The idea is to include the first indicator in the 19 
utility function, using it as a proxy for the omitted variable and therefore transferring the 20 
endogeneity from the original endogenous variable to the indicator. Then, the second 21 
indicator serves as an instrument to correct the endogeneity of the first indicator, using 22 
the CF approach. The second indicator is a valid instrument for the first indicator, as both 23 
are correlated because both are explained by the omitted variable; it is also uncorrelated 24 
with both the original error tem of the utility function DQGWKHILUVWLQGLFDWRU¶VHUURUWHUP25 
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under the assumption that both indicators are redundant in the structural equation of utility 1 
if the omitted variable is included (Guevara 2015). 2 
In the case of price-quality associations, one would only require two indicators of quality 3 
to apply the MIS approach. Unlike proxies, indicators can be noisy and they do not need 4 
to have a causal relation with the omitted variable, but quite the contrary, it is the omitted 5 
variable that causes and explains both indicators. Therefore, simple quality ratings from 6 
the consumers or experts could be used. The former would be preferable though, as they 7 
measure expected quality directly. When applied to solve the endogeneity problem due 8 
to the price-quality association, the MIS approach could effectively provide consistent 9 
estimates for both the positive and negative effects of price, through the first indicator 10 
and price coefficients, respectively. However, two reliable and independent (given the 11 
omitted variable) indicators must be available. As we only had a single quality indicator 12 
in our dataset we could not apply the MIS approach. 13 
Finally, the Latent Variable approach to endogeneity correction consists in explicitly 14 
modelling the omitted variable as a latent variable. To do this, two pieces of information 15 
are required: (i) at least one indicator of the omitted (latent) variable, and (ii) one or more 16 
exogenous explanatory variables for the omitted variable. This method requires strong 17 
distributional assumptions, as the structural relation between the omitted variable, its 18 
explanatory variables, and the choice is explicitly (and parametrically) formulated. 19 
However, its data requirements (at least in the context of this study) are easier to fulfil, as 20 
it does not require hard-to-find proxies or instrumental variables, and it only requires one 21 
quality indicator. 22 
The Latent Variable approach is the only method that provides a consistent behavioural 23 
model in the context of price-quality associations. Therefore, it allows to clearly separate 24 
the positive and negative effects of price, and to separately model the perception of 25 
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quality, and the willingness to buy. This is particularly useful when consumers cannot 1 
perceive the quality of a product and therefore must infer it from observable attributes. 2 
2.3 Endogeneity in the foods and beverages literature 3 
In the foods and beverage choice literature, endogeneity has been considered mainly in 4 
WKH FRQWH[W RI SULFH¶V VLPXOWDQHRXV GHWHUPLQDWLRQ GXH WR supply and demand 5 
equilibration. Using a panel of scanner data at the household level and discrete choice 6 
models, Villas-Boas & Winer (1999) applied the CF approach to test and control for 7 
endogeneity in the yoghurt and ketchup market. They found evidence of endogeneity, 8 
which they explained on the simultaneous determination of price. Also using household 9 
data, but analysing it through a discrete-continuous model, Richard & Padilla (2009) 10 
analysed the impact of promotions in fast food consumption. They also found evidence 11 
of price endogeneity using a CF approach, which they again explained on the 12 
simultaneous determination of price. 2¶1HLOOet al. (2014) recognized that their analysis 13 
of food choices could be affected by endogeneity, but did not explicitly control for it. 14 
In the wine choice literature, endogeneity has been explicitly controlled for mostly in the 15 
context of aggregate demand models. Cuellar & Huffman (2008) used aggregate data to 16 
estimate the price elasticity using linear models with grape prices as instrumental 17 
variables to correct for endogeneity. Stasi et al. (2011) used Italian market aggregate data 18 
and simultaneous equation modelling to measure the impact of geographical indicators, 19 
while correcting for endogeneity using several instrumental variables, such as lagged 20 
prices and seasonal dummies. Michis & Markidou (2013) used aggregate data from 21 
Cyprus and a system of simultaneous equations to identify the determinants of wine price, 22 
and took PDUNHWFRQFHQWUDWLRQDQGFRPSHWLWRUV¶SULFHVDVLQVWUXPHQWDOYDULDEOHVWRFRUUHFW23 
for price endogeneity. 24 
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To the best of our knowledge, only two papers deal with the endogeneity problem when 1 
modelling wine demand at the individual level using stated choice experiments. In 2 
particular, although Appleby et al. (2012) do not mention endogeneity explicitly, their 3 
approach can be seen DVXVLQJ:LQH6SHFWDWRU¶VUDWLQJVDVDSUoxy for quality, yielding 4 
reasonable results. However, as discussed in the previous sub-VHFWLRQWKHXVHRIH[SHUWV¶5 
ratings as proxies for quality is highly questionable. 6 
Mastrobuoni et al. (2014) used a two-stage process (somewhat similar to our approach) 7 
to separate the positive and negative effects of price in a SP experiment. However, they 8 
mixed the Proxy and Latent Variable approaches to correct for endogeneity. Their 9 
experiment appears to yield reasonable results, but the method is not applicable to 10 
VLWXDWLRQVZLWKRXWWDVWLQJLWUHVRUWVWRH[SHUWV¶UDWLQJVDVDSUR[\IRUTXDOLW\DQGXVHVD11 
sequential estimation process, which could lead to new endogeneity problems as the 12 
GHWHUPLQLVWLFSDUWRI WKHILUVWVWDJHORJLW¶VXWLOLW\ LVDQRLV\DQGWKerefore endogenous) 13 
proxy for quality. 14 
In this paper, we use the latent variable approach to correct for endogeneity. Our 15 
particular application is a stated wine choice experiment where consumers provided a 16 
single quality indicator per alternative, additionally to their choices. Due to the way our 17 
data was collected, we are not able to offer any comparison of the Latent variable 18 
approach with other methods. BLP requires market-level data, which does not exist in a 19 
SP experiment. The proxy method in a SP setting implies providing an expert ranking for 20 
consumers to use as a proxy for quality, but as consumers do not seek this information in 21 
real settings we did not include it the experiment. The CFA is not applicable as there are 22 
no available instruments in a SP setting, and we only have one quality indicator in our 23 
dataset, therefore the MIS approach cannot be applied either (as it requires at least two 24 
indicators).  25 
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3 Materials and methods 1 
3.1 Survey design 2 
In association with a private Chilean Vineyard, we designed a computer-based Stated 3 
Choice (SC) experiment (Rose & Bliemer 2009; Rose et al. 2008; Ortúzar & Willumsen 4 
2011, section 3.4) that was applied to a sample of Chinese wine consumers, including 5 
experts, students and regular consumers. Respondents were presented with six choice 6 
scenarios (also called choice exercises) with three alternatives each (Caussade et al. 7 
2005), plus a non-purchase alternative if they rather wished to opt out. 8 
We considered four attributes in the SC experiment (Table 1): label design (6 levels), 9 
JUDSHYDULHW\ OHYHOVQDPHDQG³VWRU\´RI WKHEUDQG OHYHOV and price (3 pivoted 10 
levels). In addition, in every choice scenario we also stated one out of two consuming 11 
occasions (formal and informal). Attributes were selected after a literature review (see, 12 
for example Lockshin & Corsi 2012), focus groups, previous experience with Chilean 13 
consumers (Palma et al. 2013), and advice from experts on the Chinese wine market. The 14 
³VWRU\´DWWULEXWHin particular, was proposed by these experts, and included both the name 15 
of the wine and a short statement describing its origin (the name and the statement were 16 
not shuffled, instead they were always paired in the same way). The objective was to 17 
provide a narrative for the product, for example, one story presented the wine as an old 18 
family tradition, while another presented it as the last innovation of a young entrepreneur. 19 
 20 
Table 1 - Attributes and their levels OHYHOV¶RUGHUKDve been altered) 21 
 Label Grape variety Story Price  Consuming occasion 
0 Label 0 Red Blend Hacienda Informal low  Informal: 
1 Label 1 Shiraz Don Juan Informal mean  ³DQLQIRUPDOGLQQHU 
2 Label 2 Cabernet Sauvignon Union Informal high  with friends" 
3 Label 3   Formal low   
4 Label 4   Formal mean  Formal: 
5 Label 5   Formal high  DIRUPDOGLQQHU´ 
 22 
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Before facing the SC scenarios, participants provided the minimum and maximum 1 
amounts of money they would be willing to pay for a bottle of wine on a formal and on 2 
an informal occasion. 7KHSKUDVLQJRIWKHTXHVWLRQZDV³,PDJLQHWKDW\RXQHHGWREX\D3 
wine for the following occasions. How much would you be willing to spend? Please 4 
indicate a minimum and a maximum amount of money you would be prepared to pay for 5 
HDFKRFFDVLRQ´Price levels of the SC experiment were pivoted based on these values at 6 
the individual level, i.e. each participant saw prices based on his/her own reported buying 7 
range for each occasion. This allowed us to make sure that participants did not see 8 
alternatives with prices outside their regular buying range, therefore avoiding them ruling 9 
out alternatives considered either too cheap or too expensive. 10 
As participants provided different buying ranges for formal and informal occasions, six 11 
different price levels were calculated for each participant: informal low (the minimum 12 
price the participant would pay for a wine to drink at an informal occasion), informal high 13 
(the maximum price in the same case as above), informal mean (the midpoint between 14 
the previous two) and three more levels analogous to the previous ones, but for formal 15 
occasions. The occasion associated with each scenario determined which set of prices 16 
(formal or informal prices) were used. 17 
Consuming occasion only varied between scenarios. Introducing more than one 18 
consuming occasion per scenario would have made the experiment unrealistic, as 19 
individuals seem to choose differently based on the consuming occasion (Dubow 1992; 20 
Quester & Smart 1998; Martínez-Carrasco et al. 2006, Jaeger & Rose 2008). 21 
We generated a D-efficient balanced design assuming a simple MNL model using N-gene 22 
(http://choice-metrics.com/). We used null priors for the experts¶ design, who answered 23 
WKHH[SHULPHQWILUVWDQGWKHQXVHGWKHH[SHUWV¶UHVXOWVDVpriors for the design for the rest 24 
of participants. The experimental design had twelve choice scenarios divided into two 25 
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blocks of six choice scenarios each, to which respondents were assigned randomly. The 1 
presentation orders of both scenarios and alternatives were randomized. 2 
Before choosing the wine they would buy in each scenario, respondents had to provide 3 
their OHYHO RI DJUHHPHQW ZLWK WKH SKUDVH ³, EHOLHYH WKLV ZLQH LV H[FHOOHQW´ for each 4 
alternative presented, using a 5-point Likert scale. This information was used as an 5 
indicator of quality for each alternative. Then, respondents were told about the consuming 6 
occasion, and asked to make their choices (including the opt-out option). Figure 1 shows 7 
an example of a choice scenario. 8 
 9 
Figure 1 ± Example of choice scenario with quality indicator for each alternative (labels have been 10 
altered) 11 
 12 
 13 
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Before facing the choice scenarios, participants also had to rate each of the considered 1 
grape varieties using a 5-points Likert scale. Based on these ratings, we built a grape 2 
variety ranking for each participant excluding ties; that is, when a participant gave the 3 
same rating for two or three grape varieties, we excluded them from the ranking. 4 
These rankings were exploded (Chapman & Staelin 1982, Ortúzar & Willumsen, 2011, 5 
section 8.7.2.3), FUHDWLQJ³JUDSHYDULHW\FKRLFHV´LQRXUGDWDVHWgenerating up to two new 6 
observations per respondent. As an example, let us consider a participant whose ranking 7 
was: (1st) Cabernet Sauvignon, (2nd) Shiraz and (3rd) Red Blend. In this case, the first 8 
³JUDSH YDULHW\FKRLFH´ZRXOG EHEHWZHHQ WKUHHZLQHVZLWK WKH VDPHDWWULEXWHVH[FHSW9 
grape variety: wine A would be a Cabernet Sauvignon, wine B would be a Shiraz and 10 
wine C would be a Red Blend, and the participant would choose wine A. The second 11 
³JUDSH YDULHW\ FKRLFH´ ZRXOG EH EHWZHHQ ZLQHV % DQG & only (wine A would not be 12 
available), and the participant would choose wine B. For participants whose rankings 13 
where shorter (due to tiesRQO\RQHRUQRQH³JUDSHYDULHW\FKRLFH´ZHUHJHQHUDWHG:KHQ14 
modelling, we multiplied the utility of the ³JUDSHYDULHW\FKRLFHV´by a scale factor, so 15 
ZHFRXOGFRQWUROIRUGLIIHUHQFHVLQYDULDQFHDPRQJWKHWUDGLWLRQDOFKRLFHVDQGWKH³JUDSH16 
variety FKRLFHV´. However, this scale parameter turned out to be not significant in the ML 17 
model, so we removed it from its reported version. 18 
3.2 Sample 19 
A total of 180 participants answered the survey; however, after data cleaning only 168 20 
responses were considered valid. The main reason to eliminate respondents was 21 
unreasonable price ranges, that were either too low (maximum was less than 1.6 USD) or 22 
too high (minimum was more than 10% of their monthly income). 23 
17 
 
The sample was divided into three groups: experts (21), regular consumers (81) and 1 
students (66). We introduced this classification, as it would help the private vineyard 2 
developing a more detailed strategy aimed at connoisseurs (experts), regular consumers 3 
and millennials (students). Most experts worked in the wine industry, mainly in marketing 4 
or trade departments, while others were wine critics. Regular consumers were mostly 5 
professionals and office clerks from different industries, including some scholars. All 6 
students were enrolled in some of the wine-related courses taught at the College of 7 
Horticulture at CAU. 8 
We used a convenience sample; therefore, there is no guarantee that it represents the 9 
average Chinese wine consumer, nor any particular segment of the Chinese wine market. 10 
Experts and consumers received a small monetary incentive for their participation and 11 
performed the experiment in a laboratory, in a controlled environment. Students, on the 12 
other hand, were invited to participate in the experiment during classes, and answered the 13 
survey later using their own computers in an uncontrolled environment. Most students 14 
(97%) were under 30 years old; more details about the sample are shown in Table 2. 15 
Given the age and profile of the students, their answers for the formal occasion were 16 
removed from the analysis, as their self-reported price ranges tended to be unreasonable. 17 
On average, students set a minimum price of 17% of their income and a maximum of 18 
129% for formal occasions; instead, experts and consumers set an average price range for 19 
the same occasions between 4% and 11% of their income. Therefore, at the end 810 wine 20 
choices were collected (126 from experts, 486 from consumers and 198 from students). 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
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Table 2 - Sample description 1 
  
Experts Consumers Students Total 
Respondents 21 81 66 168 
     
Gender 
    
   Female 11 43 50 104 
   Male 10 38 16 64 
     
Age 
    
   18 - 24 0 0 1 1 
   25 - 30 2 20 64 86 
   31 - 35 10 35 1 46 
   36 - 40 4 10 0 14 
   41 - 50 2 8 0 10 
   51 - 60 2 7 0 9 
   >60 1 1 0 2 
     
Maximum level of education attained 
 
   12th grade or less 1 2 0 3 
   Graduated high school 1 2 2 5 
   Some college, no degree 0 7 62 69 
   Associate degree 3 2 0 5 
   Bachelor's degree 3 61 2 66 
   Post-graduate degree 13 7 0 20 
     
People in household 
  
   Unknown 1 0 0 1 
   1 1 3 0 4 
   2 4 12 1 17 
   3 9 37 48 94 
   >3 6 29 17 52 
     
Household monthly income (USD) 
 
   <800 0 5 12 17 
   <1600 4 23 30 57 
   <2400 3 19 15 37 
   <3200 6 6 4 16 
   <4000 3 13 4 20 
   <4800 2 1 0 3 
   <5600 1 6 0 7 
   >5600 2 8 1 11 
     
Average buying price range (USD) 
 
   Min Informal 24 18 17 19 
   Max Informal 83 69 64 69 
   Min Formal 51 79 57 66 
   Max Formal 159 221 345 262 
 2 
All participants rated the three grape varieties included in the experiment, giving rise to 3 
a personal ranking, which was exploded providing up to two additional choices per 4 
participant (as mentioned above, ties were excluded). Experts provided 27, consumers 5 
111 and students 59 of these choices. Considering all choices (both wine and grape variety 6 
choices), 1007 observations were used for estimation. 7 
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3.3 Modelling 1 
Two models were estimated with the available data: a traditional Mixed Logit (ML) 2 
model with random coefficients without considering an endogeneity correction 3 
(McFadden & Train 2000, Train 2009, chapter 6) and a Hybrid Choice (HC) model using 4 
random coefficients and the latent variable approach to correct for endogeneity (Ortúzar 5 
and Willumsen, 2011, section 8.4.3; Bolduc & Alvarez-Daziano 2010, Guevara 2015). 6 
Comparing both models allows determining how effective the latter is in dealing with 7 
endogeneity. 8 
In the ML model, all attributes explain choice by entering the utility function directly 9 
(Figure 2). 10 
 11 
Figure 2 - ML model structure (for each alternative) 12 
 13 
The deterministic utilities of the alternatives, their full utilities and the model¶V likelihood 14 
for one individual are shown in equations (1), (2) and (3), respectively. 15 
 ௝ܸ௧௡ ൌ ܺԢ௝௧௡ߚ௑௡൅ ൫ߚ௣௥௜௖௘ ൅ ߚ௣௥௜௖௘௘௫௣௘௥௧݁ݔ݌݁ݎݐ௡ ൅ ߚ௣௥௜௖௘௦௧௨ௗ௘௡௧ݏݐݑ݀݁݊ݐ௡൯݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௝௧௡ (1) 
 ௝ܷ௧௡ ൌ ௝ܸ௧௡ ൅ ௝߳௧௡  (2) 
 ܮሺଓറ௡ሻ ൌ න ൭ෑ ݁௏೔೟೙ ? ݁௏ೕ೟೙௝௧ ൱ ෑ ܸ݁݅݃݊ ? ܸ݆݆݁݃݊݃ ߮൫ߚ௑௡หߤఉ೉ ǡ ȭఉ೉൯݀ߚ௑௡ (3) 
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where ௝ܸ௧௡  is the deterministic part of the choice utility for alternative j in scenario t for 1 
respondent n. ܺԢ௝௧௡  is a row vector of alternative j¶Vattributes (excluding price); ߚ௑௡ is a 2 
vector of random parameters representing respondent n¶VSUHIHUHQFHVIRUDWWULEXWHVRWKHU3 
than price; ݁ݔ݌݁ݎݐ௡ and ݏݐݑ݀݁݊ݐ௡ are dummies which take the value 1 if respondent n is 4 
an expert or a student respectively, and 0 otherwise; pricejtn LVWKHDOWHUQDWLYH¶VSULFH. ௝ܷ௧௡  5 
LV WKHDOWHUQDWLYH¶VIXOOUDQGRPXWLOLW\DQG ௝߳௧௡ is an iid Extreme Value type 1 random 6 
error that gives the choice probability its logit form. ଓറ௡ is the vector of choices made by 7 
respondent n; ௜ܸ௧௡ is the deterministic part of the utility of the chosen alternative i in 8 
choice scenario t by respondent n; ௜ܸ௚௡ is the deterministic part of the utility of the chosen 9 
alternative i, by respondent nRQWKH³JUDSHYDULHW\FKRLFH´g; ߮൫ߚ௑௡หߤఉ೉ ǡ ȭఉ೉ ൯ is the 10 
multivariate normal density function of all random coefficients included in the ߚ௑௡ 11 
parameter vector, with vector ߤߚܺ as mean and the diagonal matrix ȭߚܺ as variance. 12 
Finally, ߤߚܺ ǡ ȭߚܺ, ߚ௣௥௜௖௘ , ߚ௣௥௜௖௘௘௫௣௘௥௧  and ߚ௣௥௜௖௘௦௧௨ௗ௘௡௧  are parameters to be estimated. 13 
No additional error components were included to model the pseudo-panel effect. We did 14 
test a specification with error components, as proposed by Daly & Hess (2010), but the 15 
HUURUFRPSRQHQWV¶VWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQs were non-significant, so we removed them from 16 
the final specification. However, as the randomness in ߚ௑௡ is between and not within 17 
participants (Revelt & Train 1998), correlation between the observations of each 18 
respondent is present, even though some confounding effects could occur (Daly & Hess 19 
2010). Consuming occasion was not considered in the final specifications either, as we 20 
tested several ways to interact it with the different attributes, and none was significant. 21 
Unlike the ML model, the HC model explains the choices made by consumers as a trade-22 
RIIEHWZHHQDQDOWHUQDWLYH¶VH[SHFWHGTXDOLW\DQGLWVSULFH(DFKDOWHUQDWLYH¶VH[SHFWHG23 
21 
 
quality is modelled as a latent variable, which is explained by its attributes including price 1 
(Figure 3). 2 
 3 
Figure 3 - HC model structure (for each alternative) 4 
 5 
Price was included as an explanatory variable both in the structural equation of the 6 
expected quality and in the choice utility in the HC model. Its first coefficient was 7 
expected to capture the positive effect of price as a cue for quality, while the second 8 
intended to measure the negative effect of price owing to the consumers¶ EXGJHW9 
restrictions. Therefore, the price coefficient was expected to be positive in the expected 10 
TXDOLW\¶Vstructural equation and negative in the choice utility function. 11 
In the HC specification, a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model was used to link the utility 12 
with choices, and an ordered logit model (Greene & Hensher 2010) to link expected 13 
quality and level of agreement with the phrase ³7KLVZLQH LVH[FHOOHQW´ The expected 14 
TXDOLW\¶V VWUXFWXUDO HTXDWLRQ (4), its measurement equation (5), the ordered logit 15 
probability function (6) and the deterministic part of the choice utility (7) are as follows: 16 
ܧܳ௝௧௡ ൌ ܺԢ௝௧௡ߙ௑௡ ൅ ൫ߙ௣௥௜௖௘ ൅ ߙ௣௥௜௖௘௘௫௣௘௥௧݁ݔ݌݁ݎݐ௡ ൅ ߙ௣௥௜௖௘௦௧௨ௗ௘௡௧ݏݐݑ݀݁݊ݐ௡൯݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௝௧௡ ൅ ߟ௝௡ ൅ ߱௧ (4) ݉݁ܽݏݑݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௝௧௡ ൌ ߣܧܳ௝௧௡ ൅ ߝ௝௧௡  (5) 
ܲ൫ܫܳ௝௧௡ ൌ ݈൯ ൌ  ? ? ൅ ఒ݁ாொೕ೟೙ିఋ೗ െ  ? ? ൅ ఒ݁ாொೕ೟೙ିఋ೗షభ (6) 
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௝ܸ௧௡ ൌ ߚாொܧܳ௝௧௡ ൅ ൫ߚ௣௥௜௖௘ ൅ ߚ௣௥௜௖௘௘௫௣௘௥௧݁ݔ݌݁ݎݐ௡ ൅ ߚ௣௥௜௖௘௦௧௨ௗ௘௡௧ݏݐݑ݀݁݊ݐ௡൯݌ݎ݅ܿ݁௝௧௡  
௝ܹ௧௡ ൌ ሺ ? ൅ ߤ௦௧௨ௗ௘௡௧ ݏݐݑ݀݁݊ݐ௡ሻ൫ ? ൅ ߤ௚௏௔௥ோ௡௞ܸ݃ܽݎܴ݊݇௝௧௡൯ ௝ܸ௧௡ (7) 
where ܧܳ௝௧௡  is participant n¶Vexpected quality of alternative j in scenario t; ܺԢ௝௧௡  is a row 1 
vector of DOWHUQDWLYH¶Vattributes (except for price); ߙ௑௡ is a vector of normally distributed 2 
random parameters representing participant n¶VSUHIHUHQFHVZLWKYHFWRUVߤఈ೉ as mean 3 
and the diagonal matrix ȭఈ೉  as variance. ߟ௝௡  is a normally distributed error component 4 
with mean 0 and standard deviation fixed to 1 (this is a requirement for identification in 5 
the structural equation model). These error components capture the expected TXDOLW\¶V6 
determinants that are not observed by the modeller (Bahamonde-Birke et al., 2015) and 7 
correlate observations of the same respondent by being invariant across choice scenarios 8 
(Daly & Hess 2010). ߱௧ is an iid normal error component with mean zero and variance 9 ߪఠଶ  to be estimated, correlating the expected quality of all wines observed on the same 10 
choice situation. measurementjtn is the RUGHUHG ORJLW¶V ODWHQW YDULDEOH GHSHQGLQJ RQ11 
expected quality and its iid Extreme Value type 1 error component ߝ௝௧௡, that gives the 12 
measurement its ordered logit form. ܲ൫ܫܳ௝௧௡ ൌ ݈൯, is the ordered logit probability of 13 
quality indicator ܫܳ௝௧௡  (level of agreement with the SKUDVH³7KLVZLQHLVH[FHOOHQW´EHLQJ14 
equal to ݈ and ௝ܸ௧௡  is the deterministic part of the choice utility. The dummies ݁ݔ݌݁ݎݐ௡ 15 
and ݏݐݑ݀݁݊ݐ௡ take the value 1 if respondent n is an expert or student, respectively, and 0 16 
otherwise. ௝ܹ௧௡ is the deterministic part of the utility scaled by factors ߤ௦௧௨ௗ௘௡௧  and 17 ߤ௚௏௔௥ோ௡௞  when the observation EHORQJVWRDVWXGHQWRULVD³JUDSHYDULHW\choice´7KH18 
dummy variable gVarRnk WDNHV WKH YDOXH  LI WKH REVHUYDWLRQ LV D ³JUDSH YDULHW\19 
REVHUYDWLRQ´DQGRWKHUZLVHScale factors analogous to these ones were tested in the 20 
ML model, but were not significant, therefore they were removed from the final model. 21 
Finally, ߤఈ೉ , ȭఈ೉ , ߙ௣௥௜௖௘ , ߙ௣௥௜௖௘௘௫௣௘௥௧,ߙ௣௥௜௖௘௖௢௡௦௨௠௘௥  ,Ȝ, ߜ௟, ߚாொ, ߚ௣௥௜௖௘ , ߚ௣௥௜௖௘௘௫௣௘௥௧, ߚ௣௥௜௖௘௦௧௨ௗ௘௡௧ , 22 
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ߤ௦௧௨ௗ௘௡௧  and ߤ௚௏௔௥ோ௡௞   are parameters to be estimated. Note that ߜ଴and ߜହ were set to 1 െ ? and ൅ ?, respectively, for identification purposes. Finally, just as in the ML model, 2 
no error components or interactions with consuming occasion were included in the utility, 3 
as they both were not significant. 4 
The likelihood function of the HC model is presented in equation (8). 5 
ܮ൫ଓറǡ റ݈൯ ൌ න ቎ෑ ቌෑ ܲ൫ܫܳ௝௧௡ ൌ ௝݈௧௡ ൯௝ ቍ ݁ௐ೔೟೙ ? ݁ௐೕ೟೙௝௧ ቏ ෑ ݁ௐ೔೒೙ ? ݁ௐೕ೒೙௝௚ ߮ሺߟ௡ሬሬሬሬറȁ ?ǡ ?ሻ߮ሺ߱௧ȁ ?ǡ ߪఠଶ ሻ߮൫ߙ௑௡หߤఈ೉ ǡ ȭఈ೉ ൯݀ߟ௡ሬሬሬሬറ݀߱௧݀ߙ௑௡ఎ೙ሬሬሬሬሬറǡఠ೟ǡఈ೉೙  (8) 
where ଓറ represent the vector of choices and റ݈ the vector of quality indicators; ௜ܹ௧௡  is the 6 
deterministic part of the utility of the chosen alternative i in choice scenario t by 7 
respondent n; ௜ܹ௚௡ is the deterministic part of the utility of the chosen alternative i by 8 
respondent n RQWKH³JUDSHYDULHW\FKRLFH´g; ߟ௡ሬሬሬሬറ is the vector containing all three ߟ௝௡  9 
associated with the expected quality of each of the three alternatives; ߮ሺߟ௡ሬሬሬሬറȁ ?ǡ ܫሻ is the 10 
multivariate normal density function for the vector of error components associated with 11 
expected quality, with mean a vector of zeros and a 3x3 identity matrix for variance. 12 ߮ሺ߱௧ȁ ?ǡ ߪఠଶ ሻ is the normal density function with mean 0 and variance ߪ ߱?.  Finally, 13 ߮൫ߙ௑௡หߤఈ೉ ǡ ȭఈ೉ ൯ is the multivariate normal density function with the vector ߤߙܺ as mean, 14 
and the diagonal matrix ȭߙܺ as variance. 15 
Both models were estimated using the Python version of Biogeme (Bierlaire 2003). 16 
Monte Carlo techniques were used to estimate the integrals on the likelihood functions, 17 
as these do not have a closed analytical form. This consists in randomly drawing a large 18 
number of points from ߮൫ߚ௑௡หߤఉ೉ ǡ ȭఉ೉ ൯ (in the case of the ML model) or ߮ሺߟ௡ሬሬሬሬറሻ, 19 ߮ሺ߱௧ȁ ?ǡ ߪఠଶ ሻ and ߮൫ߙ௑௡หߤఈ೉ ǡ ȭఈ೉൯ (in the case of the HC model) and then evaluating 20 ൬ ? ௘ೇ೔೟೙ ? ௘ೇೕ೟೙ೕ௧ ൰  ? ܸ݁݅݃݊ ? ܸ݆݆݁݃݊݃  (in the case of the ML) or ൤ ? ቀ ? ܲ ቀܫ݆ܳݐ݊ ൌ ݈݆ݐ݊ቁ݆ ቁ ܹ݁݅ݐ݊ ? ܹ݆݁ݐ݆݊ݐ ൨  ? ܹ݁݅݃݊ ? ܹ݆݆݁݃݊݃  (in 21 
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the case of the HC), for each of these points. The average of all these evaluations is a 1 
FRQVLVWHQWHVWLPDWRURIWKHLQWHJUDO¶VYDOXH (Train 2009, chapters 9 and 10). 2 
4 Results 3 
Table 3 and 4 VKRZ WKH 0/ DQG +& PRGHOV¶ estimated coefficients as well as their 4 
goodness of fit measures. All reported t-test are robust (i.e. they were calculated using the 5 
³VDQGZLFKHVWLPDWRU´FOXVWHULQJE\UHVSRQGHQW). Both models were estimated using 1000 6 
Modified Latin Hypercube Sampling draws (Hess et al. 2006). Even though we tested 7 
interactions with consuming occasion in both models, none turned out to be significant, 8 
so we removed these from the final specifications reported in this document. The same 9 
holds true for the scale factors IRU³JUDSHvariety FKRLFHV´ and participant classes (experts 10 
and students) in the ML model. In the HC modeOLQVWHDGWKH³JUDSHYDULHW\FKRLFHV´DQG11 
WKHVWXGHQWV¶VFDOHIDFWRUVwere significant and, therefore, kept in the model. We also kept 12 
the non-significant main effects of attributes to facilitate comparisons between models, 13 
and to avoid endogeneity problems due to the omission of relevant attributes. 14 
Results indicate that the HC model works as expected. The Price coefficients have the 15 
expected signs (i.e. SRVLWLYHLQWKHH[SHFWHGTXDOLW\¶VVWUXFWXUDOHTXDWLRQDQGQHJDWLYHLQ16 
WKHFKRLFHXWLOLW\7KHTXDOLW\LQGLFDWRUOHYHORIDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHSKUDVH³WKLVZLQHLV17 
H[FHOOHQW´ VWURQJO\ FRUUHODWHV ZLWK H[SHFWHG TXDOLW\ DV UHIOHFWHG E\ D SRVLWLYH DQG18 
significant parameter Ȝ. Finally, expected quality has a positive and significant effect on 19 
choice utility. 20 
In the ML model none of the Price parameters are significant. Instead, in the HC model 21 
all Price parameters have the expected sign: positive in the expected quality structural 22 
equation, and negative in the choice utility; and most of them are significant using a one-23 
tail t-test (t-test critical value of 1.645 at 95% significance). In particular, only students 24 
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exhibit a significant use of price as a cue for quality, while all classes exhibit a 1 
significantly negative effect of price, though with different intensities: students are the 2 
most sensitive, followed by experts and regular consumers. 3 
Table 3 - Coefficients and goodness of fit measures for the ML model (robust t-test are reported) 4 
  
Main effect   Standard deviation 
    Value t-ratio   Value t-ratio 
Choice Grape variety 1 0.000 0.00 
 
0.646 4.71 
utility Grape variety 2 -0.036 -0.32 
 
0.445 2.52 
 
Label 1 -0.338 -2.20 
 
0.586 2.40 
 
Label 2 -0.008 -0.06 
 
0.069 0.84 
 
Label 3 0.045 0.23 
 
0.990 3.09 
 
Label 4 -0.375 -2.05 
 
0.892 2.38 
 
Label 5 0.171 1.06 
 
0.317 0.73 
 
Story 1 -0.101 -0.85 
 
0.338 1.40 
 
Story 2 0.145 1.32 
 
0.267 0.90 
 
Price -0.001 -0.97 
   
 
Price x experts -0.005 -1.57 
   
 
Price x students -0.006 -1.36 
   
 
Center position 0.212 2.41 
   
  No purchase -2.010 -7.30       
Goodness Number of parameters 
   
23 
of fit Number of observations (respondents) 
 
1007 (168) 
indicators Loglikelihood 
    
-1170.974 
 
ʌϸ 
    
0.114 
 
Adjusted ʌϸ 
    
0.096 
 
&RUUHFWHGȡð 
    
0.022 
 First Preference Recovery (FPR)    0.331 
 FPR Expected value    0.387 
 Chance recovery (CR)    0.274 
 5 
Concerning attributes other than price, even though there are similarities between both 6 
models, results are not always consistent between them. The main effects of Grape variety 7 
are zero in both models, meaning that ±on average- there is no particular grape variety 8 
preferred over others. However, as all standard deviations of Grape variety are 9 
statistically significant, preferences for grape varieties are highly heterogeneous among 10 
participants. Both models agree on labels 1 and 4 being ±on average- less preferred than 11 
the base label, though with significant variability in the population. Both models also 12 
agree on labels 2, 3 and 5 to be ±on average- equivalent to the base label. But both models 13 
disagree on how preferences for labels 2, 3 and 5 distribute among the population, with 14 
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the ML model implying that only preferences for label 3 have significant variability, 1 
while the HC model suggests that the preferences for all three labels do. Finally, the effect 2 
of Story is also different in both models: while the ML results imply that all stories are 3 
equivalent, the HC model recognizes story 1 to be the least preferred on average, and 4 
preferences for story 1 and 2  have significant variability among the population. 5 
Table 4 - Coefficients and goodness of fit measures of the HC model (robust t-tests are reported) 6 
  
Main effect   Standard deviation 
    Value t-ratio   Value t-ratio 
Expected Grape variety 1 0.086 0.420 
 
1.250 2.520 
quality Grape variety 2 -0.247 -1.140 
 
1.190 3.620 
 
Label 1 -0.617 -2.600 
 
0.946 3.560 
 
Label 2 -0.070 -0.370 
 
0.771 2.710 
 
Label 3 -0.411 -1.400 
 
1.450 2.700 
 
Label 4 -0.863 -2.480 
 
1.410 4.280 
 
Label 5 0.069 0.350 
 
0.914 2.880 
 
Story 1 -0.548 -2.710 
 
0.794 2.030 
 
Story 2 -0.188 -1.290 
 
1.050 3.780 
 
Price 0.001 1.540 
   
 
Price x experts 0.003 1.360 
   
 
Price x students 0.009 2.130 
   
 
ߪఠ 0.621 2.020    
 
ʄ 0.854 4.240 
   
 
Threshold 1 -5.100 -15.100 
   
 
Threshold 2 -3.000 -11.770 
   
 
Threshold 3 -0.263 -1.130 
   
 
Threshold 4 2.320 8.800 
   
       
Choice Expected quality 0.640 4.490 
   
utility Price -0.002 -2.460 
   
 
Price x experts -0.008 -2.650 
   
 
Price x students -0.028 -1.880 
   
 
Center position 0.308 2.880 
   
 
No purchase -2.400 -9.410 
   
 
ߤ௚௏௔௥ோ௡௞  -0.684 -3.670 
   
  ߤ௦௧௨ௗ௘௡௧ -0.608 -4.680       
Goodness Number of parameters 
   
35 
of fit Number of observations (respondents) 
  
1007 (168) 
indicators 
  
with indicators  without indicators 
 
Loglikelihood 
 
-4184.61 
  
-1181.42 
 
ʌϸ  0.714   0.106 
 
Adjusted ʌϸ  0.712   0.079 
 
&RUUHFWHGȡð 
 
0.072 
  
0.013 
 
AIC 
 
4254.6 
  
1251.4 
 
BIC 
 
8611.2 
  
2604.9 
 
First Preference Recovery (FPR) 0.331 
 
 
FPR Expected value 
 
0.385 
 
 
Chance recovery (CR) 
 
0.274 
 
 7 
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Both models indicate that most of the main effects are statistically equivalent to zero. This 1 
is probably due to preferences being highly heterogeneous among consumers, cancelling 2 
out on average. As there is no single grape variety, label or story clearly superior to the 3 
others, preferences are only a matter of taste. This reflects on the relatively high values 4 
of the standard deviations estimated for most parameters, a phenomenon better captured 5 
by the HC model than by the ML model. This variability seems to be inherent to all 6 
consumers, and not an artefact arising from mixing different classes of them (i.e. experts, 7 
regular consumers and students). We tested removing students -probably the most 8 
eccentric class- and found no evidence of a decrease in preference variability, nor an 9 
increase of t-tests on their average effects. 10 
:HWHVWHGWKHHIIHFWRIDOWHUQDWLYHV¶SRVLWLRQRQFKRLFHE\LQFOXGLQJFRQVWDQWVIRUWKHOHIW11 
and central alternative (see Figure 1) in the utility function. Results were consistent in 12 
both models, with only the central position achieving significance. We therefore kept a 13 
constant for the central alternative in the final model, effectively controlling for 14 
presentation order bias. 15 
Both scale parameters are negative, meaning that the grape variety choices, as well as all 16 
choices by students, have more variability than those by experts and regular consumers 17 
(see equation 7). This is to be expected, as preferences for grape variety are highly 18 
heterogeneous and students are the less knowledgeable class of respondents. Scale factors 19 
for regular choices and consumers are normalized to one, i.e. ሺ ? ൅ ߤ௖௛௢௜௖௘ሻ ൌ20 ሺ ? ൅ ߤ௖௢௡௦௨௠௘௥ ሻ ൌ  ? for identification purposes. We tested a scale factor ߤ௘௫௣௘௥௧ for 21 
experts, but ൫ ? ൅ ߤ௘௫௣௘௥௧൯ it was not significantly different from one. 22 
The goodness of fit indices of both models must be compared with care, as their structures 23 
are different: while WKH0/PRGHOWDNHVLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQRQO\WKHFRQVXPHUV¶ choices, 24 
the HC model also includes the expected quality indicators. Therefore, only the choice 25 
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part of the HC model must be taken into account when comparing fit indices (Table 4 1 
presents goodness of fit indices differentiated for the whole HC model and its choice 2 
component). As expected, the ML model fits choices better, as all its parameters are 3 
exclusively dedicated to fit them, unlike the HC model, where the grape variety, label and 4 
VWRU\SDUDPHWHUVPXVWUHSURGXFHWKHUHVSRQGHQWV¶DQVZHUVIRUERWKWKHH[SHFWHGTXDOLW\5 
indicators and the choices. This extra restriction implies a difference of 10 points between 6 
their log-likelihoods, and a global loss of fit as the ȡ2, adjusted ȡ2, corrected ȡ2, and 7 
Akaike and Bayesian information criterions (AIC and BIC) point out. This loss of fit is 8 
significant (p<0.01) according to Horowitz (1983¶VWHVWIRUQRQ-nested models. 9 
In principle the prediction capacity of both models could be tested in-sample and out-of-10 
sample. TKH)LUVW3UHIHUHQFH5HFRYHU\)35RU³SHUFHQWFRUUHFWO\SUHGLFWHG´is an index 11 
of prediction accuracy, which assumes that the alternative with the highest predicted 12 
probability is chosen, and then it compares this prediction with the actual choices to 13 
GHWHUPLQHKRZPDQ\WLPHVWKHSUHGLFWLRQZDV³DFFXUDWH´However, this is a poor index, 14 
as Train (2009, page 69) explains: ³The researcher has only enough information to state 15 
WKHSUREDELOLW\WKDW WKHGHFLVLRQPDNHUZLOOFKRRVHHDFKDOWHUQDWLYH«7KLV LVTXLWH16 
different from saying that the alternative with the highest probability will be chosen each 17 
time.´Following Gunn & Bates (1982) we present the actual FPR, its expected value and 18 
the value of Chance Recovery (CR), i.e. the prediction by chance. Results are as expected, 19 
because market shares in unlabelled experiments tend to be similar to chance recovery, 20 
as otherwise the experiment would be unbalanced towards a particular alternative. 21 
Furthermore, the FPR is expected to improve significantly if we used individual level 22 
parameters for prediction (Train 2009, chapter 11). 23 
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5 Discussion 1 
In this study, the HC model using expected quality as a latent variable allowed us to 2 
successfully reduce price endogeneity. This reflects on the increased t-test of the price 3 
coefficients in the choice utility for all groups of participants. This improvement is caused 4 
by the separation of the positive effect of price due to its role as a cue for quality, and its 5 
negative effect due to the participants¶ budget restrictions. While the positive effect is 6 
captured in the structural equation of perceived quality, the negative effect is captured in 7 
the choice utility. 8 
Comparing our results with other wine studies can only be done in general terms. Most 9 
comparable studies were not performed on the same market as ours, so price sensitivities 10 
are expected to change. However, it is possible to analyse the general behaviour of price 11 
coefficients estimated in studies both with and without endogeneity correction. 12 
Among the studies that do not correct for endogeneity, most tend to find non-linear effects 13 
of price, such that mid-range prices provide higher utilities than lower and higher prices. 14 
This is likely due to the double effect of price: people may think that wines below some 15 
price are of low quality, therefore utility increases with price for a certain interval, but 16 
after overcoming a given price threshold, the budget restriction outweighs the price-17 
quality association and the choice utility decreases again. Lockshin et al. (2006) do not 18 
report the coefficients of their estimated model, but plot simulations showing how market 19 
shares first increase with price, reach a peak at about US$ 11 and then decrease again 20 
after that point. Similarly, Mtimet & Albisú (2006) used a quadratic form for price finding 21 
a similar concave shape, with the peak utility at about US$ 7. Using dummies for price 22 
levels and latent classes, Remaud et al. (2008) and Mueller et al. (2010) found that some 23 
classes had this same concave behaviour. 24 
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Unlike other studies, Barreiro-Hurlé et al. (2008) and Stasi et al. (2014) obtained 1 
monotonic decreasing effects for price in the choice utility without correcting for 2 
endogeneity. Stasi et al. (2014) used customised (pivoted) prices for alternatives, varying 3 
among 90% and 140% of the average wine price in the area and obtained a negative and 4 
significant price coefficient; but it is possible that their strategy for determining 5 
DOWHUQDWLYHV¶SULFHVRQO\DOORZed them to capture the decreasing part of the price-utility 6 
curve (i.e. where the budget effect overweighs the price-quality association). Something 7 
similar might had happened in the work of Barreiro-Hurlé et al. (2008), who found a 8 
negative and highly significant price coefficient using four price levels: 3, 7, 10 and 14 9 
Euros (about 4, 9.5, 14 and 19 US$). According to Mtimet & Albisú (2006), who also 10 
studied the Spanish market, three of these levels would fall into the part of the price-utility 11 
curve where the budget effect overweighs the price-quality association. Palma et al. 12 
(2013) also found a negative coefficient for price; however, they explicitly pivoted the 13 
DOWHUQDWLYHV¶ SULFHV DERYH the participants self-reported willingness to pay for the 14 
considered occasion (from 100% to 160%). 15 
Papers that do correct for endogeneity at an individual level yield results as expected. 16 
Appleby et al. (2012) used H[SHUWV¶UDWLQJVDVDSUR[\IRUTXDOLW\ZKHQPRGHOOLQJDVWDWHG17 
purchase decision. They found a negative and significant effect of price, as well as a 18 
positive effect for the H[SHUWV¶UDWLQJV+RZHYHUas very few attributes were included in 19 
their study LW LVSRVVLEOHWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVUHOLHGRQWKHH[SHUWV¶UDWLQJVPRUHWKDQWKH\20 
would under more realistic conditions (Channey 2000, Johnson & Bruwer 2004, 21 
Goodman 2009, Atkin & Thach 2012). 22 
Mastrobuoni et al. (2014) estimated both the positive and negative effects of price 23 
separately, finding a negative and significant coefficient for the budget effect of price, 24 
and a positive and significant effect for the price-quality association, though only up to 5 25 
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Euro (about US$ 7). Their approach to endogeneity correction could be considered as 1 
mixed, as they explicitly separated the modelling of both effects (i.e. used a latent variable 2 
approach), but also included H[SHUWV¶UDWLQJVDVDSUR[\IRUTXDOLW\ In their experiment, 3 
consumers tasted a set of wines, then chose their preferred alternative, and finally chose 4 
the one they would buy. With the first answer the authors modelled the perceived quality 5 
XVLQJH[SHUWV¶UDWLQJVZKLFKFRQVXPHUVGRQRWVHHDVDSUR[\IRUVHQVRU\TXDOLW\7KHQ6 
they explained the (hypothetical) purchase decision as a trade-off between price and 7 
perceived quality. This approach has three main limitations. First, as it includes tasting, 8 
the method is not suitable for situations where the consumer has not tasted the wine (e.g. 9 
a first buy). Secondly, and aVPHQWLRQHGEHIRUHWKHXVHRIH[SHUWV¶UDWLQJVDVDSUR[\IRU10 
sensory quality has been questioned (Hodgson 2009). Finally, the proposed estimation 11 
method neglects the inherent noise of perceived quality, therefore introducing 12 
endogeneity (the measurement of perceived quality becomes a noisy proxy). We tested 13 
an analogous procedure to Mastrobuoni et al. (2014) with our dataset, yielding only 14 
positive coefficients for price. 15 
In our application, significant coefficients were obtained for the positive effect of price 16 
on students, and on all classes of participants for the negative effects of price. Consumers 17 
DQG H[SHUWV¶ SRVLWLYH HIIHFWRI SULFH KDG WKH H[SHFWHG VLJQ ZLWK RQH-sided) t-WHVWV¶ S18 
values of 0.06 and 0.09. Results seem to be robust to the particular model structure, as we 19 
estimated models without random parameters and with random price parameters, and 20 
results remained analogous (i.e. the sign of the price coefficients remained the same, and 21 
their t-tests did not decrease significantly). 22 
Students were found to be the most price-sensitive group, but also those who more 23 
strongly associated price with quality, as it would be expected for lower-income and less 24 
knowledgeable consumers. Experts appeared to be more price sensitive than regular 25 
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consumers, probably because they purchased wine more frequently than regular 1 
consumers and therefore looked for cheaper alternatives. This, however, is only a possible 2 
explanation, as we did not record consuming nor purchase frequency in our questionnaire. 3 
We tested for other possible explanations, such as income effect and non-linearity in the 4 
effect of price, but none of them turned out to be significant. 5 
The positive effect of price could be overstated because of our experimental design. By 6 
asking participants at the beginning of the experiment what their minimum and maximum 7 
willingness to pay for wine were, and then using these values throughout the SC 8 
scenarios, we might have reinforced the use of price as cue for quality1. Let us consider 9 
the following situation. Participants, when asked for their minimum WTP, think of the 10 
lowest quality wine they would be willing to buy and state their WTP for it. Then, when 11 
asked for their maximum WTP, respondents think of the best quality wine they have tried, 12 
and state their WTP for it. This would lead them to associate immediately the low price 13 
with low quality and the high price with high quality during the SC experiment. This, 14 
however, could not happen if participants did not use price as a cue for quality. If that 15 
was the case, then their willingness to pay range would be completely determined by their 16 
budget constraint and the lowest wine price in the market. Therefore, even though our 17 
experimental design might have artificially increased the positive effect of price to some 18 
degree, it could not have artificially induced it. To avoid this potential problem, we 19 
recommend using predetermined price ranges when applying the endogeneity correction 20 
method. 21 
Concerning attributes other than price, results of the model with (HC) and without (ML) 22 
endogeneity correction are generally aligned, but the HC model seems to provide more 23 
information. Preferences for grape variety are highly heterogeneous in the sample, 24 
                                               
1
 We are grateful to an unknown referee for having made us note this. 
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making it impossible to declare a single variety as preferred ±on average- over the others. 1 
Labels 1 and 4 are less preferred than the base label, while preferences for labels 2, 3 and 2 
5 seem to be equivalent to the base label on average, though both models disagree on the 3 
(significant) level variability of these preferences. Finally, while the ML model makes no 4 
difference among preferences for stories, the HC model suggests that story 1 is ±on 5 
average- significantly less preferred than the base story. These results indicate that price 6 
endogeneity might not only affect the price parameters EXW DOVR RWKHU DWWULEXWHV¶7 
parameters, though to a lesser degree. 8 
We used random coefficients to capture preference heterogeneity, but latent classes 9 
models are also an interesting approach to capture it. Latent classes are easier to interpret 10 
than random coefficients, but when the number of different classes is big, they require a 11 
higher number of parameters to be estimated. In the case of wine, the heterogeneity of 12 
preferences is such that many different classes would be required (as confirmed by some 13 
preliminary estimations). Given that our sample had a limited size, we decided to use 14 
random coefficients instead. 15 
Contrary to some published literature (Quester & Smart 1998, Hall 2003, Martinez-16 
Carrasco et al. 2006), we found that the effect of consuming occasion was non-significant 17 
for Chinese respondents. Several factors may have influenced this result. First, we may 18 
have described the consuming occasion without enough detail, making it difficult for 19 
participants to picture themselves in it. Secondly, it may be that simply stating the 20 
consuming occasion is not enough to evoke such a context in the mind of Chinese 21 
consumers; therefore, more compelling methods should be tried in the future. Finally, in 22 
formal occasions the Veblen (or snob) effect is more likely to play an important role, but 23 
this effect usually manifests itself through brand value. As brands were fictional in our 24 
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experiment, this effect was probably absent, therefore diminishing the effect of 1 
consuming occasion. 2 
Several simple improvements could be applied to the method employed in this paper in 3 
order to correct for endogeneity. First, more than one expected quality indicator could be 4 
used, though it remains to be determined what indicators would be best. Secondly, it is 5 
not necessary to collect an expected quality indicator for each alternative, as it would be 6 
possible to separate the survey into two parts: one where only quality indicators are 7 
collected (i.e. a series of wines the expected quality of which had to be assessed), and 8 
another one where only choices are required (i.e. as in a traditional SC experiment). This 9 
could allow optimizing the data collection method by using different efficient designs for 10 
each stage, but might decrease the correlation between expected quality and choice. 11 
Despite the limitations of this particular application, modelling quality as a latent variable 12 
seems to be a promising approach to deal with endogeneity while being consistent with 13 
commonly accepted behavioural frameworks and not demanding excessive extra effort 14 
from respondents. Additionally, this method does not require difficult±to-find proxies or 15 
instruments. Finally, the method seems to be fairly robust, as it worked on a relatively 16 
small and very heterogeneous sample, using a single quality indicator, and on a choice 17 
experiment that was not incentive compatible, where choosing an expensive wine had no 18 
actual consequence on participants. 19 
Even though this particular case study was concerned with wine choice, the modelling 20 
structure can be applied to any product the quality of which is uncertain to the consumer, 21 
even after considering observable attributes. Most food and beverage products fit this 22 
description, but also many leisure activities do too (e.g. selecting a travel company, 23 
choosing a show or a play, etc.), as well as some sparsely bought products or services the 24 
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quality of which is hard to determine by the consumer even after purchase (e.g. jewellery, 1 
some medicine, broadband providers, etc.). 2 
Our approach should not be of much use in cases were the main source of endogeneity is 3 
the Veblen effect. In such cases, endogeneity is caused by the unobserved social benefits 4 
of conspicuous consumption, which are correlated with price, but are not related with 5 
perceived or expected quality. Therefore, modelling quality as a latent variable in such 6 
cases would not provide any new information; even more, it might lead to the wrong 7 
conclusion that price itself has a positive effect on consumers, when in reality it is 8 
conspicuous consumption that provides utility to the consumer. In these situations, 9 
including the brand of the product or a measure of its social appreciation might be more 10 
useful. 11 
It is very likely that consumers present both the Veblen effect and the use of price as a 12 
cue for quality at the same time. This is probably more problematic in a revealed 13 
preference context, were brand and quality uncertainty go hand in hand, but less so in a 14 
SP experiment with fictional brands, such as the one analysed in this paper. As no real 15 
brands were presented, there is no benefit to be obtained from conspicuous consumption, 16 
beside that provided by the observable attributes (e.g. a particular label looking more 17 
luxurious than another). 18 
Modelling quality as a latent variable assumes that prices are exogenous. Therefore, this 19 
method corrects endogeneity only due to the use of price as cue for quality, but does not 20 
FRUUHFWHQGRJHQHLW\GXHWRSULFH¶VVLPXOWDQHRXVGHWHUPLQDWLRQLHVXSSO\DQGGHPDQG21 
equilibrium). If this later effect is to be considered, then an additional endogeneity 22 
correction method especially suited for it should be used. 23 
The latent variable approach for endogeneity correction shows highly promising results, 24 
but its real performance should be measured against a revealed preference study, an area 25 
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we are currently working on. The method should also be compared with other available 1 
approaches to correct for endogeneity, notably the Control Function Approach (CFA) and 2 
Multiple Indicator Solution (MIS).  3 
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